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“The Yankees have called New York home for 115 years, but unfortunately, moving the 
staff and stadium to this Caribbean island is the only way to shield [themselves] from the MLB’s 
punishing tax system and maintain acceptable levels of profitability,” ​The Onion​ reported from 
“Island Harbor, Anguilla” in “Yankees Avoid Luxury Tax by Moving Franchise to Offshore 
Location .” The satire reads like one of those early Internet piracy campaigns: you wouldn’t 1
download a car; you wouldn’t download a pizza. You wouldn’t offshore a baseball team. But in 
today’s international tax regime—globalized, hypermobile, and with the potential for near-total 
anonymity—the notion isn’t quite so far-fetched. People might not offshore a baseball team, 
that’s true, but they ​would​ offshore all of its corporate income and intellectual property rights. 
And, increasingly frequently, they ​do​: today, 83 of the United States’ largest 100 corporations, 
and 99 of Europe’s 100 largest, have subsidiary entities located in countries considered to be tax 
havens .  2
The increasing global dominance​ of multinational corporations (MNCs) has placed 
incredible strains on domestic taxation systems by giving rise to complex offshore accounting 
and tax avoidance structures. It is now easier than ever to drastically reduce one’s effective tax 
burden through the exploitation of international tax loopholes and other income-shifting 
techniques. Moreover, doing so is, for the most part, entirely legal given current tax policies in 
the U.S. and abroad. Multinationals profit immensely from these schemes, but they do so at the 
expense of aggregate international economic welfare, depriving governments of tax revenue and 
forcing working- and middle-class citizens to bear increasing tax burdens. As such, this paper 
1 “Yankees” 
2 Shaxson pg. 8 
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aims to analyze the current state of our international tax regime, the ways in which it has been 
vehemently exploited by tax havens and corporate offshoring, and some potential solutions to 
address the bane of multinational tax avoidance.  
It is important to note that the clientele of tax havens ranges from individuals to 
mega-corporations, and that the activities they practice span the entire spectrum of legality, from 
(technically) lawful tax avoidance to highly illicit evasion, money laundering, and terrorist 
financing operations. This project, however, focuses solely on the “legal” exploitation of the 
international tax system by multinational corporations to avoid or reduce effective taxation. Of 
course, this subset of the offshoring industry is in many regards inseparably entangled with the 
other sorts of activities that occur in tax havens, at times to the point of complete legal 
ambiguity: as stated by former British Chancellor Denis Healey, “‘The difference between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is the thickness of a prison wall .’” Nonetheless, there are particular 3
factors that distinguish the corporate issue as a separate and unique challenge in the larger fight 
against illicit international financial flows. Reforming MNC income taxation is a necessary first 
step in tackling some of the more explicitly insidious practices facilitated within tax havens.  
How International Taxation Works 
Discussing multinational corporate tax avoidance is futile without first understanding 
both how the international tax system works. At its most basic, taxation is what gives legitimacy 
to governments ; it represents a basic social contract in which in exchange for their dollars, 4
taxpayers are able to use the public goods and services that tax revenues finance, such as roads or 
education . In a pre-globalized world, taxation, though never easy, was at least simple: tax rates 5
3 qtd. Shaxson pg. 23  
4 See Tilly pg.172 for more explanation on tax systems as a form of state creation 
5 Zucman pg. viii 
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 were set, programs like the U.S.’s Internal Revenue Service oversaw collection (and tracked 
down evaders), and tax revenues were used as the government deemed fit. Unfortunately, in the 
modern era, globalization and the near-instantaneous mobility of capital have complicated things 
considerably. As explained by Toder and Viard: 
“In principle, it is desirable for sovereign nations to choose their own fiscal policies. 
Citizens of different countries, with different economies, populations, and cultural values, 
should have the right to choose the level and composition of public spending and taxes 
that best satisfies their preferences and economic circumstances… Nonetheless, when 
economic activities transcend national boundaries, each country’s fiscal policies are 
constrained by the policies of other countries .”  6
In other words, countries can no longer concern themselves only with the taxation happening 
within their borders. They must now also consider the impact of international taxation, both in 
terms of other sovereign states’ tax systems as well as domestic multinationals operating 
overseas.  
As such, governments today face a crucial choice in deciding how to tax the income of 
multinational corporations—a territorial (source-based) system, in which corporate income is 
taxed in the country where it is earned, or a worldwide (residence-based) system, in which it is 
taxed in the country where the corporation is headquartered . Let’s say, for example, that Nike, a 7
U.S.-resident company, earns income from sneakers sold in Argentina. Under a territorial 
system, the profits of that sale would be taxed by Argentina, since the sale occurred in 
Argentinian territory. Under a worldwide system, on the other hand, the tax would be levied by 
6 Toder pg. 19 
7 Knoll pg. 101 
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 the U.S., the jurisdiction in which Nike is headquartered, regardless of the location of the sale 
itself.  
If all the countries in the world were to universally adopt a single tax system, 
international taxation would be fairly simple. Where issues arise, then, are instances in which 
sovereign nations choose opposing taxation methods. If Argentina uses a territorial system and 
the U.S. uses a worldwide system, for example, both countries would claim the right to tax the 
same profits, an issue referred to as double taxation. The reverse is also problematic: if Argentina 
(worldwide) assumed the U.S. would tax Nike, but the States (territorial) believed that Argentina 
held taxation rights, the profits wouldn’t be taxed at all—a concept known as double 
nontaxation. The former is unfair to corporations and creates disincentives to operate 
internationally, while the latter violates the social contract in which the users of public goods and 
services must assist in financing those goods and services. In other words, someone is always 
bound to lose.  
In addition to avoiding both double taxation and double nontaxation, governments have 
additional choices to make in pursuing various forms of capital neutrality, or the minimization of 
tax-based distortions upon decision-making processes . Capital neutrality is generally expressed 8
in three benchmarks—capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import neutrality (CIN), and 
capital ownership neutrality (CON)—for the three main types of investment decisions 
susceptible to distortion by taxation. Though countries would ideally strive to achieve all three, 
neither tax systems allow for more than two. As such, international taxation has become 
8 Knoll pg. 100 
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 inseparably entangled not just with globalization and capital mobility itself, but also with 
countries’ ever-shifting (and rarely harmonious) economic and political priorities. 
Capital export neutrality ensures that multinational corporations are not unevenly 
incentivized to do business between domestic and foreign jurisdictions , thereby maintaining tax 9
equity between corporations earning only domestic income and those also earning income from 
foreign subsidiaries . CEN can only be achieved between two countries who both use worldwide 10
taxation . This is best demonstrated through an example. Continuing our Argentinian Nike 11
hypothetical, let us now assume that Argentina has a corporate income tax rate of 20% while the 
U.S. has a rate of 40%, and that both have worldwide tax systems. Whether Nike shoes are sold 
in the U.S. or in Argentina, the income is taxed at 40% by the U.S., so Nike has no tax-based 
incentive to do business in one country versus another. Moreover, Nike gains no tax advantage 
from operating an Argentinian subsidiary when compared to a local U.S. retailer that only does 
business domestically: both firms’ profits will be subject to the same 40% corporate income tax 
rate. 
If we substitute a territorial tax system for either the U.S. or Argentina (or both) in this 
example, CEN fails to be achieved. Let’s start by substituting a territorial system for Argentina 
with either a territorial or worldwide system in the States. When Nikes are sold in the U.S., the 
profits are taxed at 40%. However, when they are sold in Argentina, the 20% Argentinian rate 
applies. As such, Nike only pays half as much in taxes abroad as they do domestically. Now 
consider a territorial system for the U.S. and a worldwide system in Argentina. Sneakers sold in 
the States are taxed by the U.S. at 40%, and according to the U.S., Nikes sold in Argentina 
9 Knoll pg. 100 
10 Avi-Yonah pg. 326 
11 Knoll pg. 120 
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 should be taxed by Argentina, the source of the income. According to Argentina, however, the 
profits should be taxed by the U.S., Nike’s headquarters. As a result, Argentinian Nike sales are 
not taxed ​at all​.  
In both scenarios, Nike pays less tax in Argentina than it does in the States, thereby 
comparatively disincentivizing doing business in the U.S. on a tax basis. This also gives Nike an 
advantage over U.S. domestic corporations, who, without foreign subsidiaries, are unable to 
access the lower foreign tax rates. In essence, the decision over the location of the corporate 
investment (of whether to conduct business at home or abroad) is distorted in favor of Argentina 
by the introduction of the tax, thereby violating neutrality of capital export. Unless both countries 
use a worldwide system—or just so happen to tax at the exact same corporate interest rate, which 
is rare—then CEN is unattainable.  
Capital import neutrality and capital ownership neutrality are unfortunately more difficult 
to understand than capital export neutrality, largely stemming from lack of clarity in their very 
definitions. As Knoll explains in “Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality,” CIN has been 
defined in two separate ways by different scholarly groups. Originally, capital import neutrality 
was used in the context of competitiveness: tax systems that achieve this benchmark maintain 
neutrality between domestic and foreign investors in a particular country . Over time, however, 12
CIN has instead become defined by the economics community as lack of distortion in individual 
investors’ savings-consumption decisions, thereby allowing all investors to earn the same 
after-tax return at the margin . For the sake of clarity, I will from this point onwards refer to the 13
12 Knoll pg. 111 
13 Knoll pg. 119 
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 original definition—of competition between investors—as capital ​ownership ​neutrality, leaving 
the term “capital import neutrality” to refer only to investors’ savings-consumption decisions.  
Both CON and CIN can be achieved with a universal territorial tax system. Within our 
Argentina (20% tax rate) and U.S. (40% tax rate) example, let us now assume a 10% rate of 
return on investments in the U.S. For a particular investment in the U.S.—let’s say, one worth 
$1000—a U.S. firm would pay a 40% tax on the $100 of income derived from the investment, 
leaving them with a 6% post-tax rate of return. If an Argentinian firm (or for that matter a firm 
from any other country) were to invest, they would still be taxed at the U.S. rate and therefore 
earn the same 6% post-tax rate of return. All firms thus value the investment the same regardless 
of the firms’ countries of origin: there is neutrality between the owners of the capital, thereby 
satisfying CON.  
From this point, capital import neutrality is achieved due to international competition 
between countries to attract foreign direct investment. To achieve the same 6% post-tax rate of 
return as the U.S., Argentina will offer a 7.5% pre-tax rate of return. As this competitive process 
occurs all over the world, post-tax rates of return will become equal across countries. This means 
that at the margin, all firms face the same consumption-savings decision: they are all indifferent 
between consuming $1 today or $1.06 one year from today. CIN examines this decision in the 
context of aggregate welfare in the economy. 
For a given investment, then, let’s assume that either the U.S. or Argentina will invest in 
order to have $1.06 a year from today, and that the country that does not invest will instead 
consume $1 today. If an Argentinian firm invests $1 in a U.S. investment, the U.S. Treasury 
gains $0.04 in tax revenue from the Argentinian firm but has a $0.04 opportunity cost in lost tax 
8 
 revenue from the U.S. firm that instead decided to consume (scenario A in the table below). The 
same premise holds if the U.S. firm invests in the U.S. investment (scenario B), if the U.S. 
invests in an Argentinian investment (scenario C), or if Argentina invests in an Argentinian 
investment (scenario D).  
CIN is achieved in this instance because The U.S. Treasury is indifferent between 
scenarios A and B, the Argentinian Treasury is indifferent between scenarios C and D, and thus 
the world economy is indifferent between all four scenarios. Regardless of which outcome is 
reached from the firms’ individual consumption-savings decisions, the respective Treasury is 
“net even” in terms of opportunity cost. As such, there is no way for a central planner to increase 
aggregate welfare through reallocation of consumption and savings between the firms. The 
introduction of the tax does not disproportionately distort any involved firm’s 
consumption-savings tradeoff.  
This same logic also explains, then, why CIN cannot be satisfied when countries use 
worldwide taxation systems. In a worldwide system, pre-tax, not post-tax, rates of return are 
equal across countries —so let’s say Argentina and the U.S. both offer a 10% pre-tax rate of 14
return. In a worldwide system, for some $1000 investment U.S. investors (40% tax) will thus 
make a 6% post-tax rate of return and Argentinian investors (20% tax) will make an 8% post-tax 
rate of return, regardless of the country in which the investment is located. This means that at the 
margin, a U.S. firm values $1 today as $1.06 one year from today, while an Argentinian firm 
values $1 today as $1.08 one year from today. When an Argentinian firm invests $1 (regardless 
14 This is the case because of the diminishing returns inherent in the worldwide system. Capital moves from areas of 
lower return to areas of higher return. As it becomes more abundant in high-return areas, however, its rate of return 
decreases. This process occurs around the world until all rates of return are standardized across countries. A similar 
process occurs in a territorial system, but is guided by post-tax rate of return, not pre-tax rate of return (as we see in 
the worldwide system).  
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 of the country in which the investment takes place), the Argentinian Treasury gains $0.02 in tax 
revenue while the U.S. Treasury loses $0.04 (scenarios E and G below). When a U.S. firm 
invests $1, the U.S. Treasury gains $0.04 while the Argentinian Treasury loses $0.02 (scenarios 
F and H).  
As such, it is better in the aggregate for the U.S. to always invest and for Argentina to 
always consume. Doing so generates $0.02 of overall revenue surplus, while allowing Argentina 
to invest and the U.S. to consume creates $0.02 of overall revenue loss. In scenarios E and G 
below, then, the introduction of a central planner could improve the aggregate welfare in the 
economy. CIN is thus impossible to achieve: the introduction of the tax distorts firms’ 
savings-consumption decisions, rendering them biased either for or against investment as 
opposed to consumption. 
CON, on the other hand, can still be attained in a universal worldwide system. To 
understand it, let’s consider the investment decision of an individual firm: the price that firm is 
willing to pay for a given investment (V) is based upon the pre-tax cash flow from that 
investment (C), the pre-tax rate of return available for an alternate investment (R), and, in a 
worldwide system, the worldwide tax rate of the firm’s respective country (t).  We can express 
this relationship as , or, simplified, . Because in a(1 )/[1 (1 )]V = C − t − t + R − t /1V = C + R  
universal worldwide taxation system the pre-tax rate of return on all investments is the same, R 
is some constant; in this example, with a 10% pre-tax rate of return, R = .1.  As such, for any 
$1000 investment (C = $1100), regardless of location, both the U.S. and Argentina value it at a 
price of ./1 1000C + R = $   
10 
 In other words, for a given $1000 investment, the U.S. will profit $60 and Argentina will 
profit $80. However, because in a worldwide system the U.S. firm will be taxed at the same rate 
regardless of the location in which it invests, it values the investment at the same price as an 
Argentinian firm because there is no other investment from which it can make a higher profit. 
The ​absolute​ income from the investment differs between the firms but the ​relative​ income a 
firm can receive between investments remains constant across all investments. All firms thereby 
value an investment at the same price regardless of their respective tax rates, sustaining capital 
ownership neutrality. The status of CEN, CIN, and CON in each type of system is summarized in 
the two tables below. 
 
Universal Territorial (Source-Based) System 
U.S. in U.S.  
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
40%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $60 profit 
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$60 post-tax income 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
today 
○ A: Consumes $1; U.S. 
Treasury loses $0.04 
○ B: Invests $1; U.S. Treasury 
gains $0.04 
Argentina in U.S. 
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
40%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $60 profit  
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$60 post-tax income 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
today 
○ A: Invests $1; U.S. Treasury 
gains $0.04 
○ B: Consumes $1; U.S. 
Treasury loses $0.04 
 
 
U.S. in Argentina 
Pre-tax rate of return = 7.5%; tax rate = 
20%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $80 profit  
● CON​: $1000 investment = $75 pre-tax 
income/$60 post-tax income 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
Argentina in Argentina 
Pre-tax rate of return = 7.5%; tax rate = 
20%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $80 profit 
● CON​: $1000 investment = $75 pre-tax 
income/$60 post-tax income 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
11 
 today 
○ C: Invests $1; Argentina 
Treasury gains $0.04 
○ D: Consumes $1; Argentina 
Treasury loses $0.04 
today 
○ C: Consumes $1; Argentina 
Treasury loses $0.04 
○ D: Invests $1; Argentina 
Treasury gains $0.04 
 
CEN is not achieved​: It is better for both the U.S. and Argentina to do business in Argentina 
than in the U.S. 
CON is achieved​: Both countries value a given investment at the same absolute price. 
CIN is achieved​: In scenarios A, B, C, and D, firms’ consumption-savings decisions are not 
distorted 
Universal Worldwide (Residence-Based) System 
U.S. in U.S.  
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
40%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $60 profit  
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$60 post-tax income 
○ V = C/1+R = $1000 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
today 
○ E: Consume $1, U.S. Treasury 
loses $0.04 
○ F: Invest $1, U.S. Treasury 
gains $0.04 
Argentina in U.S. 
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
20%; post-tax rate of return = 8% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $80 profit  
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$80 post-tax income 
○ V = C/1+R = $1000 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.08 a year from 
today 
○ E: Invest $1, Argentina 
Treasury gains $0.02 
○ F: Consume $1, Argentina 
Treasury loses $0.02 
 
 
U.S. in Argentina 
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
40%; post-tax rate of return = 6% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $60 profit 
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$60 post-tax income 
○ V = C/1+R = $1000 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.06 a year from 
today 
○ G: Consume $1, U.S. Treasury 
loses $0.04 
○ H: Invest $1, U.S. Treasury 
gains $0.04 
Argentina in Argentina 
Pre-tax rate of return = 10%; tax rate = 
20%; post-tax rate of return = 8% 
● CEN​: $100 income = $80 profit  
● CON​: $1000 investment = $100 
pre-tax income/$80 post-tax income 
○ V = C/1+R = $1000 
● CIN​: $1 today = $1.08 a year from 
today 
○ G: Invest $1, Argentina 
Treasury gains $0.02 
○ H: Consume $1, Argentina 
Treasury loses $0.02 
12 
  
CEN is achieved​: Both the U.S. and Argentina are indifferent between doing business 
domestically or abroad. 
CON is achieved​: Both countries value a given investment at the same relative price. 
CIN is not achieved​: It is better overall for the U.S. to always invest and Argentina to always 
consume (scenarios F and H) because doing so generates $0.02 of surplus. 
 
 
This all goes to say, in the end, that countries face a tradeoff when choosing which tax 
system to follow. A universal territorial system, in which CIN and CON are achieved but CEN is 
impossible, could hurt domestic businesses who must compete with multinationals. A universal 
worldwide system, on the other hand, provides CEN and CON but not CIN, and could thus 
distort investment decisions in the international economy. For these reasons, countries have 
taken different stances on which system to use. Today most major countries tax corporate 
income territorially, levying taxes upon the profits of corporations located within their borders 
and exempting foreign-earned income from taxation .  15
Nonetheless, lack of uniform international consensus on any particular system creates 
opportunities for exploitation. These opportunities are in turn heightened by complexities within 
specific tax legislation language—such as differences between countries in the definitions of 
“source of income ” or “country of residence ”—that can make consensus appear more 16 17
widespread on paper than in practice. Finally, international taxation difficulties are even further 
advanced by the decision of some countries (notably the United States) to forgo both the 
traditional territorial ​and ​worldwide systems in favor of a hybrid approach that includes elements 
15 “How Does…” 
16 Toder pg. 7: “The United States defines a U.S.-resident corporation as a company that has its principal place of 
incorporation in the United States. Some other countries define residence based on where a company conducts the 
major portions of its “headquarters” activities, such as central management, finance, and research.”  
17 Toder pg. 13: “Like the residence of a corporation, the source of income is hard to define. As a result, it is easy for 
taxpayers to manipulate a tax base defined by source of income.”  
13 
  
of both . All of these factors influence governments’ ability to prevent double taxation, MNCs’ 18
opportunities for double nontaxation, and countries’ capital neutrality decisions. As such, a 
country must somehow strike a balance between all of these priorities when composing its 
international corporate tax agenda.  
U.S. Taxation: Current System and Historical Background 
The United States does not utilize the source-plus-exemption system seen throughout 
most of the rest of the world, but rather a hybrid system comprising elements of both source and 
residence taxation. Within U.S. borders, a 21% federal tax rate applies to all corporate income 
earned, regardless of the residence of the corporation that earned it (source-based taxation) . An 19
additional state income tax, ranging from 3% to 12% but averaging at 6%, is levied in 44 U.S. 
states, but these state taxes are fully deductible on federal taxes . As such, a corporation 20
operating within the United States generally pays a total effective rate slightly higher than 21%, 
but lower than its total statutory rate of 21% plus the state statutory rate .  21
This source-based system is largely the same as the one used by most other countries 
around the world. Where the States differs from its counterparts abroad is that it does not exempt 
the foreign-earned income of U.S.-resident corporations and subsidiaries, known as Controlled 
Foreign Corporations (CFCs) . It instead employs a quasi-worldwide system in addition to its 22
domestic territorial system in order to tax CFC earnings. The rate at which this income is taxed 
depends, however, on which of four categories the foreign income falls under—income with 
18  Toder pg. 9 
19 “How Does…” 
20 Pomerleau 
21 Pomerleau 
22 Toder pg. 6. Note that CFCs are legally separate entities from their parent corporations, and that they pay full 
taxes to the countries in which they generate income (provided that that country employs a territorial tax system). 
14 
 normal returns, Global Intangible Low-Tax Income (GILTI), Subpart F income, or Foreign 
Derived Intangible Income (FDII) .  23
Normal returns on physical assets, considered by the federal government to be 10% per 
year on the depreciated value of those assets, are not taxed by the U.S. Any return above 10% on 
physical assets is considered GILTI, a classification used to target intangible income  earned in 24
particular low-tax jurisdictions and tax havens. GILTI is taxed at 10.5%, half the source-based 
corporate income tax rate, with an 80% credit  for any foreign tax paid. This means that for 25
income that falls under the GILTI category, MNCs pay no corporate income tax to the U.S. if the 
foreign income tax rate is above 13.125%. In other words, it is only taxed by the States if its 
source country tax rate is considered unreasonably low.  
GILTI, however, is not taxable by the States in the first place until that income is 
repatriated to a CFC’s U.S.-based parent company. This process, known as tax deferral , allows 26
potentially taxable revenue to remain untaxed by the U.S. so long as it is located overseas. In 
order to prevent all international profits from escaping U.S. taxation through deferral, certain 
types of foreign income are deemed taxable at the time the income is earned, without the ability 
for deferral. Types of income that fall under these rules, known as Subpart F income, include 
passive income , certain types of easily shiftable income, and investment dividends, even if 27
23 “How Does…” 
24 “What Is…” Intangible income is income earned from intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
etc. 
25 For information on tax credits versus deductions, look at “Tax Credits”: “​Tax credits provide a dollar-for dollar 
reduction of your income tax liability. This means that a $1,000 tax credit saves you $1,000 in taxes. On the other 
hand, tax deductions lower your ​taxable income​ and they are equal to the percentage of your ​marginal tax bracket​. 
For instance, if you are in the 25% tax bracket, a $1,000 deduction saves you $250 in tax (0.25 x $1,000 = $250).” 
26 Toder pg. 6 
27 “Publication 550”: “​A passive activity generally is any activity involving the conduct of any trade or business in 
which you do not materially participate and any rental activity.”​ Passive income is that derived from passive 
activities; it includes coupon payments from bonds; interest, dividends, and royalties payments; etc. 
15 
 those dividends are not distributed to shareholders . The United States taxes Subpart F income 28
at 21%, with a 100% credit for foreign income taxes up to the U.S. tax rate . 29
The final major category of foreign-earned income in the eyes of the U.S. government is 
Foreign Derived Intangible Income, or “the profit a firm receives from U.S.-based intangible 
assets used to generate export income for U.S. firms .” Examples of FDII include foreign-earned 30
income from patents or other intellectual property trademarks held in the U.S., such as 
pharmaceutical patents, corporate brand logos, and the like. This income is taxed at a maximum 
rate of 13.125%, rather than 21% , in hopes that it will encourage U.S-resident corporations to 31
locate their intangible assets in the States. FDII is therefore used in tandem with GILTI, offering 
the “carrot” of a lower tax rate on intangible income generated from U.S.-held assets (FDII) and 
threatening the “stick” of a levied tax on intangible income generated from foreign-held assets in 
low-tax countries (GILTI) .  32
Many of these specifics  that make up the U.S. corporate income tax have actually been 33
created and/or modified only recently with the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in 
December 2017 . As noted by Phillips and Wlodychak,  34
The TCJA “reflected a realization that our [former] federal corporate income tax 
system… reduced our nation’s economic competitiveness. Further, our worldwide system 
28 “LB&I” 
29 “How Does…” This essentially means that if a country has a corporate income tax rate equal to or higher than the 
U.S. rate, Subpart F income is exempt from U.S. taxation. If a country has a lower rate than the U.S. (as most do), 
Subpart F income is taxable by the States only at an amount equal to the difference between the potential 
U.S.-assigned tax burden and the foreign country-assigned tax burden. 
30 “How Does…” 
31 “How Does…” 
32 Vari 
33 “How Does…”  
34 Pomerleau 
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 of taxation created significant disincentives for companies to remain headquartered in the 
United States .”  35
In effect, the TCJA demonstrates a shift in the country’s political agenda—one in which the 
government was willing to disproportionately lower tax rates upon the country’s wealthiest in 
order to spur economic activity and boost American competitiveness. This is not the first time 
changed political priorities have caused alterations to tax policy, nor will it be the last. Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah’s “All of a Piece Throughout” describes how political and normative changes have 
impacted the United States’s international tax policy in the 20th and 21st centuries, periodizing 
U.S. history into four distinct eras of taxation. 
From 1918 until 1960—what Avi-Yonah terms the “Age of Benefits” , the States based 36
its taxation regime on the belief that a government’s right to tax derives from the social contract 
of conferring benefits upon taxpayers in exchange for their payments. As such, the U.S. 
government employed a territorial system in which it claimed the right to tax foreign subsidiaries 
operating in the States. The government justified this decision with the fact that all U.S.-source 
companies, regardless of country of residence, drove on taxpayer-funded roads, employed 
publicly-educated workers, and the like. Similarly, it declined to tax overseas subsidiaries of 
American-based corporations, since they received a proportion of benefits too minute to justify 
any U.S. taxation.  
Over time, however, the drawbacks of the territorial system—namely its lack of 
CEN—became the focus of the Kennedy administration in 1961. In the “Age of Neutrality” , 37
which lasted until 1980, the priority of the U.S. international tax agenda became ensuring that no 
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 tax distinction is made between multinational corporations and corporations operating solely 
domestically. During this period of rapid international expansion for U.S. corporations, the 
government, still bound to the Gold Standard, worried about the balance of payments 
consequences  of not taxing the international income of American companies. As such, it 38
promoted a worldwide system under the platform of equity for all businesses, with neutrality 
(capital export neutrality) coming to serve as the “dominant normative argument” for the two 
decades that followed .  39
As the worldwide system became increasingly normatively accepted over time, so too 
arose criticisms of its goals and priorities. In the “Age of Competition”, which lasted from 
1981-1997 , globalization caused policymakers to begin calling into question the decision to 40
prioritize international welfare at the expense of U.S. interests. Rising global competition and the 
drive to attract increasingly mobile foreign capital put pressure on the States to maintain its own 
competitiveness on the international stage, leading to a reduction of source-based taxation in 
favor of a territorial system. As the concept of arbitrage, or “exploiting the difference in the tax 
rules of two countries to create double nontaxation,”  emerged during this time, the adoption of 41
territorial taxation policies aided the U.S. in attracting investors at low tax rates. Arguments 
supporting international welfare were abandoned in favor of principles of territoriality and 
unilateralism, much like those of the recently-enacted  TCJA that governs U.S. taxation today.  
Avi-Yonah argues that the fourth era of U.S. international corporate taxation, the “Age of 
Cooperation”, does not mark a transition from territorial to worldwide taxation or vice versa, but 
38 See pg. 30 for more discussion of the impact of tax avoidance on balance of payments calculations. 
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 rather a shift from isolationism to collectivism in terms of U.S. collaboration with international 
groups. Beginning in 1998 with the Clinton administration’s agreement to cooperate with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) harmful tax competition 
initiatives, the dominant U.S. tax policy priority became working together with trade partners 
and “addressing the pressures of globalization not through competition, but through 
cooperation.”  It aims to reduce both double taxation ​and ​double nontaxation through initiatives 42
such as information sharing and the creation of tax haven blacklists.  
The 2016 Panama Papers and 2017 Paradise Papers leaks, however, call into question 
whether Avi-Yonah’s “Age of Cooperation” still exists, or, really, whether it ever existed in the 
first place. On the surface countries appear to desire international cooperation to address tax 
issues: the issue remains at the top of the G20 agenda , and there have been recent actions taken 43
by governments to close some of the largest international tax loopholes. It becomes difficult to 
believe that the international community is truly putting its best effort towards dismantling 
harmful tax practices, however, when the OECD’s most recent tax haven blacklist includes only 
Trinidad & Tobago—“just one tiny country and clearly not the only, or even anything like the 
main, source of the world’s global financial secrecy ”—and when government officials have 44
repeatedly been exposed as the perpetrators of some of the world’s largest tax evasion and/or 
avoidance systems . In fact, the very “Age of Cooperation” that saw initial U.S. adherence to 45
OECD legislation also gave birth to Clinton’s Qualified Intermediary program , which 46
outsourced the screening of American bank accounts at foreign financial institutions and 
42 Avi-Yonah pg. 337 
43 Turner 
44 Knobel “Blacklist” 
45 “Paradise Papers: Everything You Need...” 
46 Shaxson pg. 135 
19 
  
significantly eased the process of performing illicit finance within the U.S.—two directly 
contradictory policies nonetheless passed under the same President within less than a decade of 
each other.  
In short, the Age of Cooperation has crumbled in the face of the Age of Exploitation, in 
which tax havens regularly find themselves in the international dialogue yet somehow manage to 
remain a grand open secret, a locked chest with a key for which no government is willing to 
search. Fear that double taxation and double nontaxation will disincentivize corporate investment 
and growth, paired with the sluggish, crowded nature of international bureaucracy, have caused 
policymakers to largely tie their own hands on the issue. It truly seems that no matter what action 
is taken to change policy, or to find a more effective balance of taxation and neutrality, evaders 
and avoiders will always remain two steps ahead—by the time a loophole is closed, another one 
is already being actively exploited. As such, despite growing civil society and nongovernmental 
pressure to innovate new solutions to tax issues, national and international governmental bodies 
are slow to respond and even slower to make any real changes beyond insipid statements of 
support. 
What Are Tax Havens and How Do They Work? 
Because of the increasing prevalence of tax haven-related issues in both popular and 
scholarly discussion, phrases like “tax haven” and “offshoring” are often thrown around in 
current events alike without definition or context. Unfortunately, there is no universal definition 
of what criteria distinguish tax havens from other jurisdictions . For the purposes of this paper, a 47
tax haven is any low-tax jurisdiction into which income is shifted in order to reduce one’s 
47 For more information on the issue of creating an agreed-upon definition of tax havens, see Shaxson pg. 8  
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 effective tax burden. Tiny Caribbean islands—the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and 
the like—tend to be the most well-known tax havens, but in reality, some of the most important 
jurisdictions for multinational corporations are located in European nations such as the 
Netherlands, Ireland, and Luxembourg. It is for this reason that Apple chose to locate in Ireland 
until 2013 , for example, or that when you purchase any Nike product in Europe, the money 48
from the sale is actually transferred to Dutch-headquartered Nike Innovate CV, rather than 
simply the executive Nike operation of the European country in which the sale took place .  49
Nike’s tax avoidance plan relies heavily on one of the main tools currently used by 
MNCs to reduce their tax burdens—transfer pricing, or the mechanism that determines the costs 
of inter-departmental transactions within a company. Multinationals use transfer pricing to take 
income earned in high-tax jurisdictions and artificially shift it to subsidiaries in tax haven 
jurisdictions under the guise of paying for goods and/or services. Technically, when one division 
of a corporation sells something to another division, the sale is supposed to be completed at an 
“arm’s length price”, or the price that would be paid if the subsidiaries were unrelated . In 50
reality, though, corporations tend not to follow this rule: companies have been caught in recent 
years transferring a kilogram of toilet paper in China for $4,121, a litre of apple juice in Israel for 
$2,052, or ballpoint pens in Trinidad and Tobago for $8,500 each, among other such ridiculous 
transactions . 51
Most multinationals are smarter than to allow themselves to get caught with $8,500 pens, 
however. By shifting trademarks, patents, and other intellectual property rights to haven 
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 jurisdictions, income can be shifted safely out of the reaches of taxes under the completely legal 
guise of paying for use of trademarks or other immaterial assets . These sorts of transactions 52
increasingly lack a “real-world” inter-corporation transaction counterpart upon which pricing 
standards can be based, leaving multinationals with complete sovereignty over the ultimate 
destination—and tax burden—of their profits. This is how Nike ensures that the profits from its 
German sales wind up in the Netherlands, for instance: Nike Innovate CV owns the rights to the 
company’s famous swoosh logo, and as such “Nike pays Nike so that Nike shoes can look like 
Nike shoes .” 53
Transfer pricing and intellectual property right shifting are not the only tools 
avoidance-seeking MNCs have at their disposal, however. Many corporations additionally alter 
the debt-equity ratios of CFCs to exploit certain particularities concerning tax deductions . 54
Because interest payments from debt-financed investments are tax deductible, while dividend 
payments from equity-financed investments are not tax deductible , MNCs disproportionately 55
load debt into CFCs located in high-tax jurisdictions in order to deduct interest payments from 
their overall tax burdens . For example, a corporation will use Subsidiary A, located in a 56
high-tax jurisdiction, to purchase a large amount of equity in Subsidiary B, located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, with A additionally borrowing the money to pay for B’s equity from B itself. The 
interest payments on A’s debt are tax deductible in the high-tax jurisdiction and also earn B 
52 This process is exactly what the U.S. government aims to avoid with GILTI and FDII taxation—it heavily taxes 
intangible income in low-tax jurisdictions by classifying them as GILTI and incentivizes moving the intangible 
assets and/or intellectual property rights to the U.S. with the FDII deduction.  
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 additional income in the low-tax jurisdiction . Overall, the corporation faces a reduced tax 57
burden in A and additional income (which will be taxed at a low rate) in B, increasing the 
MNC’s income solely through reallocating debt and equity.  
Corporations would be unable to use transfer pricing or debt-equity swaps to move 
income, however, without the exploitation of legislative loopholes that allow them to do so—and 
thereby, the tacit agreement of the countries into which the income is shifted. In a world where 
money can be moved across borders nearly instantaneously, the only way for a tax haven to 
ensure that it both flows and remains within its borders is to offer the lowest rates and most 
lenient, exploitable policies. As countries compete to attract foreign income and investment, they 
therefore become caught in a race-to-the-bottom cycle of competition, slashing tax rates and 
tearing open legislative loopholes. Generally, this process is neither hidden behind closed doors 
nor obscured under the guise of other political aims: it is apparent and explicit so long as one 
takes the time to look. In fact, some of the most “famous” of the corporate-friendly policies 
enacted by tax havens have earned themselves nicknames, such as the Dutch Sandwich or 
Double Irish , as an odd sort of tribute to their repeated successes in helping MNCs sidestep 58
their international tax responsibilities.  
With tax havens offering increasingly lucrative incentives for MNC investment, any 
international corporation would be foolish to not take advantage of these policies in order to 
minimize costs and maximize profits. The products of tax competition are some of the most 
potent pull factors that draw corporations out of their traditional tax jurisdictions and into tax 
havens, often through complex series of legislative hoops and financial structures. This is how 
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 European Nike profits inevitably find their way into the Netherlands via the Innovate CV, for 
example, even though they sometimes travel through three or four other institutions along the 
way . The allure of reduced effective taxation is so great that companies like Apple or Alphabet, 59
the parent company of Google, are willing to go through the whole process of setting up a 
company resident in Malta, registering it in Ireland, shifting intellectual property rights to it, 
establishing a ​second​ company resident and registered in Ireland, rerouting all foreign sales to 
the Irish-resident corporation, and then having the Irish-resident corporation pay huge 
intellectual property use fees to the Maltan company—a trick known as the Single Malt —just 60
to avoid paying full taxes.  
In addition to these pull factors, tax changes in the current jurisdiction where an MNC is 
located also act as ​push​ factors that motivate MNCs to relocate or otherwise change their tax 
systems. Clausing classifies these sorts of corporate reactions as either financial responses, which 
involve the movement of income, or real ones, which involve the relocation of assets such as 
employment or economic activity . She uses the following equation to calculate the 61
semi-elasticity of these responses, or the percent change in tax revenues, for a given change in 
the tax rate: 
 Tax revenue ​R​ is a function of the tax rate ​T​ and reported profits 𝛱​r​, where 𝛱​r ​is equal 
to actual profits 𝛱​a​ plus some difference ​μ​, such that ​R = T*​𝛱​r = T*(​𝛱​a - μ). ​We can 
therefore find the percent change in revenues for a change in tax rate by taking the 
derivative of this equation, ​𝜕R/𝜕T. ​The derived equation is equal to ​( ​𝛱 ​a-μ) + 
[T*(𝜕​𝛱 ​a/𝜕T)] - [T*(𝜕μ/𝜕T)]​, where​ ​the first term (𝛱​a-μ​) accounts for the direct effect of 
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an increased tax rate on revenues, the second term [​T*​(​𝜕​𝛱 ​a/𝜕T​)] factors in real responses, 
and the third term [​T*​(​𝜕μ/𝜕T ​)] factors in financial responses .  62
In an analysis of 31 studies, Clausing finds that the median tax rate semi-elasticity is -2.9, or that 
for a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate, foreign direct investment falls by 2.9% due to 
financial and real corporate responses . She concludes that “as tax rates increase, more tax 63
avoidance activity occurs, as firms have increased incentives to take steps that reduce their tax 
burden .” 64
Of course, quantifying the exact financial effect of non-financial changes, such as the 
opening or closure of tax loopholes, is a much more difficult process. We can conclude, 
however, that because corporations are willing to operate through extremely intricate channels of 
foreign subsidiary corporations and international income shifting, the effect of these policy 
changes is nonetheless potent. This combination of push and pull factors increasingly lures 
corporations not only out of their traditional tax jurisdictions, but also specifically ​into​ tax haven 
jurisdictions. Along the way, as havens compete to attract investment, statutory rates are slashed 
and governmental leniency towards corporate chicanery becomes the international standard. 
And, as globalization removes traditional barriers to entry into the offshore world, the tax haven 
phenomenon continues to expand at an alarming rate.  
Why Should We Care About Tax Havens? 
Groups concerned with tax havens have released multitudes of statistics detailing the 
extensive magnitude of the international tax avoidance network. More than half of world trade 
and banking assets, and more than one third of foreign direct investments, for example, pass 
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 through tax havens; 83 of the 100 largest multinational corporations in the United States, and 99 
of the 100 largest in Europe, have subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions . In fact, one third of 65
the United Kingdom’s 700 largest businesses paid no corporate tax at all in 2007 . In addition to 66
corporate profits, roughly 8% of all personal wealth—an 
estimated $7.6 trillion USD—resides in tax havens as well . 67
To put it simply, the offshore system is not just a byproduct of 
globalization: it lies right at the center of the global economy. 
Moreover, its presence and influence will only continue to 
grow as both companies and individuals shift their wealth to 
foreign jurisdictions . 68
These statistics are worrisome because we know on a 
baseline level that tax havens are bad. They allow certain 
privileged groups to dance around the law as they see fit, 
escaping their obligated tax burdens—and doing so legally—at 
the expense of the less fortunate. This argument of lost tax revenue and social inequality is 
perhaps the most intuitive reason for why the global community should dedicate itself to the 
elimination of tax havens, but it is far from the only reason. The arguments against offshoring 
range from ethical to political to quantitative: the numbers don’t lie, and when the truth they tell 
isn’t enough, appeals to moral decency offer additional support. A few of the most compelling 
arguments are explained below.  
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 First and foremost, it would be amiss to advocate against tax evasion without discussing 
its impact on tax revenues. As corporations create elaborate offshore systems to reduce their 
effective tax burdens, governmental tax bases are drastically reduced. In 2017, for example, Nike 
paid an effective tax rate of just 13.2%, less than half the 35% United States corporate tax rate at 
the time . If a corporation with one billion dollars in profits reduces its effective tax rate by just 69
10%, its taxing government loses $100 million in tax revenue—and make no mistake, these 
corporations, the “‘global grandmasters of tax avoidance schemes ,’” make many billions of 70
dollars in profits. When it all adds up, governments lose as much as $240 billion in revenues 
every year, according to the OECD .  71
At face level, the depletion of global tax bases is in and of itself an issue worth 
addressing. The real danger of tax havens is only made more evident, then, by considering who 
is forced to bear the brunt of this burden. As stated by an article from the United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner,  
“...corporations use publicly-funded infrastructure to transport and sell their products, 
employ people who have normally been educated at public expense, and expect their 
managers and employees to receive publicly-funded healthcare when they are ill. Yet, 
[they] shift their profits around to reduce their own tax contributions to a minimum .” 72
Offshoring as a form of tax avoidance is a tool accessible only to megacorporations and 
mind-bogglingly wealthy individuals—entities that will never have to rely on forms of assistance 
made possible by tax revenues, such as welfare, healthcare, or social security. When tax bases 
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 are cut, so are these and other public goods and services. As such, the use of tax havens is not 
only an issue of taxes themselves, but also an issue of social equality and socioeconomic 
injustice.  
Just as tax havens place undue burdens on the working and middle classes, then, they also 
disproportionately affect developing economies in the international system. Though rich, 
developed economies pay the largest absolute costs—in Europe, for example, roughly $2.6 
trillion dollars of wealth is located in tax havens, costing governments as much as $7.8 billion 
every year—the highest relative burden falls upon developing economies that are less able to 
adequately address offshoring. Roughly 10% of Europe’s wealth is located overseas, but for less 
developed economies this rate is often two to three times greater: in Russia, as much as 50% of 
wealth has been shifted outside the country’s borders . The countries deprived of these tax 73
revenues are those who most need them in the first place: as a result of these losses, economic 
development is disproportionately stalled and quality of life suffers.  
Even small economies that are the perpetrators, rather than the victims, of offshoring are 
often unduly targeted by the international community. Tax haven blacklists from organizations 
like the OECD or the European Union generally focus on small economies with big loopholes, 
such as Palau or St. Lucia, and ignore large economies with (comparatively) smaller loopholes , 74
such as the United States or United Kingdom, even 
though the overall quantity of money that 
“escapes” through the large economies is greater 
than that of the small economies. Although the Tax 
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 Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index ranks the U.S.—a country with 22% of the 
international market share of the offshore financial services industry—as its second-worst global 
offender, for example, the OECD Global Forum still ranks the States as “largely compliant” with 
international guidelines on financial transparency and exchange of information . As such, small 75
developing economies are publicly castigated for their membership in the offshoring network 
while other major perpetrators never face consequences from the global community.  
The magnitude of this issue becomes even more evident when contextualized in the 
highly competitive global offshoring market. Small economies who engage in tax competition 
are blacklisted by groups such as the OECD while still competing in the same market as larger 
economies who receive no penalties for their involvement. The effect of this process is catalytic. 
Small economies must already take drastic measures to remain competitive with large ones, 
resulting in devastatingly low tax rates and gaping loopholes. However, because this particular 
subset of countries has already been established as the international offshoring scapegoat, they 
have no incentive against taking such extreme measures—what’s the worst that could happen, 
they receive another slap on the wrist?  
These small jurisdictions—Caribbean islands and the like—are far more reliant on 
foreign investment as a form of economic activity than other larger economics. For countries 
with small populations and few exports, tax haven profits often serve as a country’s economic 
backbone. As such, in addition to lacking any concern for the potential international 
repercussions, these jurisdictions are are all the more desperate to retain the economic activity 
they do have. With the presence of these parties for whom there is no real disincentive towards 
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 drastic competitive measures, all jurisdictions become caught in an intense race to the bottom. 
After all, “a little in one’s own country is better than a lot in someone else’s ,” and some 76
countries are willing to do whatever it takes to attract that little bit, even if it means dragging 
everybody else down with them along the way. 
This process, though beneficial for individual corporations or individual tax havens, is 
incredibly toxic for the international economy as a whole. Engaging with the world of offshoring 
requires time, capital, and other resources that could be allocated elsewhere, yet nothing is 
produced better or more cheaply as a result . Capital no longer flows to the places with the best 77
returns, but rather the places with the lowest tax rates and the most lenient policies, creating 
fundamental distortions that “prevent effective oversight of financial markets, make crises more 
likely and enable rich insiders to shift all the risks and the costs of bailouts onto the working 
majority and away from the investing minority .” As governments in non-haven countries slash 78
their statutory rates to deter offshoring—as the U.S. has recently done with the TCJA—they do 
not just lose tax revenue from shifted income; they also pay the opportunity cost of reduced 
revenue from the assets that remain .  79
These blatant inefficiencies have additional indirect impacts by creating 
misrepresentations of the international financial statistics, namely balance of payments statistics, 
that enable us to understand the state of the world economy. When these statistics lose 
significance, the world faces adverse consequences in terms of financial regulation and stability. 
In addition, partial and/or unequal access to true information about the economy can cause 
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 individuals, corporations, and governments to make decisions that do not actually maximize 
profits, utility, or efficiency. This fundamental distortion of the truth causes inefficiency at its 
most benign and crisis at its most severe, preventing parties from equally accessing information 
and from accurately interpreting what pieces of information they are able to access. 
The balance of payments errors caused by offshoring and tax havens are glaringly 
obvious on both national and international scales. Income is recorded as a liability when it is 
earned, but when it is shifted offshores it is not recorded as an asset, leading to inaccurately large 
current account deficits in tax haven jurisdictions. In 2008, for example, the Cayman Islands 
reported $2.2 trillion in equity liabilities but only $750 billion in portfolio assets to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)—a discrepancy that “simply goes unexplained .” The 80
consolidation of many countries’ deficits creates a glaring disparity that is then reflected in the 
global balance of payments: according to IMF data in 2015, $255 billion was paid but not 
received, and this gap is only widening every year .  81
The impact of balance of payments issues goes beyond the surface-level misinformation 
of statistical error. Countries who report huge current account deficits, for example, such as the 
United States (-$466 billion USD) and the United Kingdom (-$106 billion USD), must maintain 
extremely high financial account surpluses to ensure equilibrium in their respective balances of 
payments . However, because the magnitude of their deficits is likely exaggerated, the 82
respective magnitude of their financial account surpluses becomes inflated as well. This sort of 
manipulation is extremely dangerous for the global economy because it presents a picture of 
countries’ financial situations that is inaccurate to an unknown degree. Countries are potentially 
80 Shaxson pg. 17 
81 Alstadsaeter pg. 9 
82 “Current Account” 
31 
  
much more vulnerable than they realize, and the danger of global imbalances or financial crisis is 
potentially much more threatening than currently predicted. Because our best statistical estimated 
are known to be flawed, however, we can never know the real truth in its entirety.  
Statistical misinformation of this sort reflects the ultimate, overarching problem of tax 
havens: they create a world that is untrue and unfair, allowing society’s wealthiest to profit 
inordinately at the expense of everybody else. Tax havens distort political and economic 
relations, damage global welfare, and reduce both national tax revenues and international 
economic efficiency. They moreover establish paradoxical norms that promote leniency and 
turning a blind eye to corruption while punishing proper accounting and/or reporting to 
authorities . While this system is still in place, any sort of real international economic 83
cooperation is impossible, or at the very least is thwarted and undermined at every opportunity. It 
is therefore imperative that real measures be taken by countries around the world to increase 
financial transparency and end tax avoidance through offshoring.  
Mitigating Multinational Corporate Income Tax Avoidance 
Finding a solution for an issue as complex and dynamic as multinational corporate 
income tax avoidance is no easy task. Truly, there is no single action that will “solve” the 
problem in its entirety, much less address larger but related issues such as the use of tax havens 
for personal wealth or for illicit and black market financial flows. Economists and scholars have 
nonetheless proposed various measures, however, that could drastically reduce corporate tax 
avoidance and its adverse impacts upon the international economy. Committing to one or more 
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 of these “first steps” would be a major development in setting both the United States and the 
world on the right path towards eradicating the tax haven system. 
Abandoning the U.S.’s Hybrid International Tax System 
In the light of changing tax policy in the U.S. , some have advocated that the country 84
follow its international counterparts and abandon the hybrid system in favor of a purely 
territorial-plus-exemption approach. This proposal would eliminate double taxation and double 
nontaxation for MNCs operating in most of the world’s major economies, as all corporate 
income earned within a given jurisdiction would be taxed by that jurisdiction and no country 
would claim a residence-based right to taxation. Essentially, this approach argues that the U.S. 
let go of foreign profits entirely rather than purporting to tax them but ultimately doing so 
unsuccessfully. It would clearly simplify tax policy, eliminating the need for crediting and 
preventing distortion of savings-consumption decisions through the achievement of CIN.  
Though the various merits of implementing a solely residence-based system can be 
argued, however, the fact remains that doing so does not achieve much in the way of actually 
reducing corporate tax avoidance. After all, the U.S. is not the only victim of this problem, the 
cause of which is related to tax system choice but not exclusively controlled by it. If U.S. CFCs 
no longer have to worry about being taxed through their parent residences in the States, they can 
shift income abroad much more freely, bound only by the laws of the territorial jurisdiction 
rather than by both the source and the residence of the income. This proposal would therefore 
reduce corporate income tax avoidance only because you cannot avoid taxes on income if that 
income is not taxed in the first place.  
84 Although the TCJA was enacted in December 2017, the U.S. is still in a transitional period of fully adopting the 
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 Eliminating the Corporate Income Tax 
On the surface level, then, an even more drastic approach in this same vein would be to 
eliminate the corporate income tax in its entirety and instead tax American shareholders on the 
accrued personal income they earn from dividends and capital gains, as proposed by Toder and 
Viard. They argue that if shareholders are fully taxed on corporate income, an additional 
corporate tax is unnecessary and creates more potential opportunities for exploitation than it 
offers abilities to actually generate tax revenue. In other words, the principle above still applies: 
you can’t avoid taxation if taxes aren’t levied in the first place. Whereas abandoning the hybrid 
system does nothing to recuperate lost revenues or enforce taxpayer responsibility, however, 
supplementing the eliminated corporate income tax with regular personal income taxation of 
dividends and capital gains ensures that the profits of corporate success are still subject to 
taxation—it is simply taxation at an individual shareholder level rather than a corporate one.  
With the elimination of the corporate income tax, taxation would become more 
progressive and less unnecessarily complicated, leaving fewer potential loopholes through which 
taxes could be avoided. “Depreciation schedules, amortization rules, inventory accounting, 
uniform capitalization, and a host of other complexities would not need to be considered with 
respect to corporations ,” notes Toder. Instead of chasing flows of income around the world, 85
through subsidiaries and corporate expenses and repatriation flows, governments would only 
have to concern themselves with capital gains and dividends earned on individual bases. This 
option is also preferential because it does not necessarily hinge upon international cooperation in 
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 order to be successful: even if the U.S. adopted this policy unilaterally, it would nonetheless 
drastically reduce corporate tax avoidance and improve American welfare .  86
Principally, the adoption of this proposal would allow the U.S. to effectively sidestep 
some of the fundamental tax questions that plague governments. Without the need to decide 
between a source-based or residence-based taxation system, there would be no tax-induced 
distortions imposed upon corporate profits—in theory, CEN, CIN, and CON could all be 
achieved simultaneously without tradeoffs or opportunity cost. No American-resident 
corporation would be disadvantaged compared to a foreign-resident corporation, and, perhaps 
most importantly, no corporation would be disadvantaged by locating income and assets in the 
U.S. rather than abroad. Shareholder-level taxation would also eliminate the disadvantage of 
financing a corporation with equity rather than debt, since there would no longer be a tax that 
allowed deductions for the latter but not the former.  
The elimination of these distortions and disadvantages would greatly disincentivize the 
income-shifting and debt/equity-swapping practices many corporations currently use to avoid 
their tax burdens, all the while promoting capital neutrality in the economy and simplifying tax 
policy. If the U.S. were to adopt this policy unilaterally, it would additionally cause a large 
inflow of capital into the country as investment in other jurisdictions, subject to corporate 
income taxes, faced a comparative disadvantage against tax-free investment in the States for 
non-American shareholders. In effect, eliminating the corporate income tax in favor of 
shareholder-level income taxation would boost investment in the American economy and prevent 
86 Toder pg. 27 
35 
 corporate income from escaping taxation, leading to a less complicated, distorted tax 
environment in the United States.  
This proposal does not come without its own set of concerns, however, both within the 
U.S. and abroad. Domestically, changing the nature of U.S. taxation would generate a large 
amount of political backlash from opponents concerned about “the idea of lowering taxes on 
corporations and raising them on people, even though corporate taxes are actually paid by people
,” or about exempting the income that foreign investors earn from U.S. corporate operations 87
from U.S. taxation. The elimination of the corporate income tax would also make it harder to 
pursue policy initiatives through the tax system: abandoning the current corporate income tax 
would also mean abandoning some of the preferential credits, such as the research tax credit, that 
promote normative goals in addition to simply tax-based ones . Overall, the fight to adopt this 88
proposal in the United States would be long and arduous, requiring a large amount of political 
will to overcome gridlock and opposition.  
Eliminating the corporate income tax in the U.S. also creates consequences 
internationally. The proposal would markedly improve American welfare, but it would likely do 
so at the expense of other countries. The large capital gains discussed above, a result of foreign 
shareholders aiming to avoid corporate income taxes in other jurisdictions, do not just come from 
nowhere: every inflow has a corresponding outflow, and as such a unilateral shift towards 
shareholder taxation would cause capital flight from other economies around the world. In this 
manner, it is questionable whether such a proposal actually reduces multinational tax avoidance. 
It very well could be the case that American shareholder taxation only reduces tax avoidance by 
87 Toder pg. 40 
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 for American corporations—and does so by increasing tax avoidance opportunities for all other 
foreign corporations as a result.  
Implementing a Formulary Apportionment System 
A far more internationally-minded proposal, then, would be to implement a formulary 
apportionment system (also known as a unitary taxation system) that “allocate[s] worldwide 
income to countries by formula… instead of requiring multinational firms to account separately 
for their income and expenses in each country .” In other words, this proposal would create 89
some formula that calculates a given country’s distribution of a corporation’s economic activity, 
such as sales, employment, and capital. The corporation’s global consolidated profits  would 90
then be allocated to each country depending on its distribution, to be taxed at whatever rate the 
country deems fit. For example, if it was decided that the best way to determine a country’s 
distribution of any given corporation’s total economic activity was based upon an equal weight 
of assets, sales, and payroll shares, the formulary apportionment equation would look something 
like , where the subscript ​us​ indicates  
 
the United States, the subscript ​w​ indicates the world,  is the tax rate, ​Πw​ is world profits, ​A t us  
is assets, ​S​ is sales, and ​P​ is payroll . 91
The benefits of a formulary apportionment system can already be observed in places like 
the U.S. and Canada, which both use unitary taxation when allocating national corporate profits 
between states or provinces . In addition to the inherent flexibility of being able to quantitatively 92
89 Clausing pg. 718 
90 See Zucman pg. 111 for more discussion on the use of global consolidated profits as a means of mitigating 
avoidance-aimed manipulation of income reporting. 
91 Taken from Clausing pg. 718 
92 Toder pg. 23 
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 weigh the relative importance of assets, formulary apportionment creates a unique opportunity 
for international cooperation while still preserving every sovereign nation’s right to choose 
how—particularly how much—to tax the corporations that operate within its borders . Similar 93
to the elimination of the corporate income tax, formulary apportionment would also eliminate the 
tradeoffs of choosing a territorial or worldwide taxation system. Countries would see improved 
respective welfare and increased tax revenues, and most importantly, they would be doing so 
collaboratively, rather than at each others’ expenses. It is because of these strong arguments that 
formulary apportionment is promoted by so many tax evasion experts, among them Clausing, 
Zucman, Toder, and Avi-Yonah.  
Unfortunately, the adoption of formulary apportionment does come with some negative 
economic externalities. Though this system does reduce the capital neutrality distortions 
otherwise seen with territorial or worldwide taxation, it also introduces new distortions in the 
choice between transactions within a group and transactions within a single firm . For example, 94
when a U.S.-based MNC wants to perform corporate operations such as marketing or 
manufacturing in a foreign jurisdiction, it has the choice between doing so with an affiliated CFC 
or with an independent company. With unitary taxation, a corporation can reduce its tax liability 
by outsourcing and contracting out activities and their associated assets (property, payroll and the 
like) to unaffiliated companies. As Toder explains, 
“[Formulary apportionment] allows the MNC to escape tax on the portion of the return 
that comes from the use of intangible capital to support manufacturing and sales activities 
in [a] high-tax jurisdiction. Although the independent companies will pay local income 
93 Zucman pg. 111 
94 Toder pg. 24 
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 tax on their profits, these profits will reflect only the return on the tangible capital they 
use in sales and manufacturing… Formulary apportionment therefore has no clear 
advantage over separate accounting for firms with significant returns from intellectual 
property .” 95
With some of most rampant corporate tax avoidance coming from intellectual property-heavy 
technology companies and brand-name bearing corporations, it seems unlikely that this danger 
can be overlooked. The question then becomes one of magnitude when comparing the distortions 
introduced by unitary taxation as opposed to the ones the current tax system currently endures.  
None of these policy details are relevant, however, without the political will to see them 
enacted in the first place. Despite potential economic drawbacks, political feasibility is truly the 
crucial feature of success for any form of formulary apportionment. The individual nations that 
currently employ unitary tax systems are able to do so successfully because their respective 
federal governments have the final say over how exactly corporate profits should be measured 
and allocated . In an international setting where all parties are equal, arriving at this consensus 96
would be a much more difficult process. Although it has been suggested that the U.S. could 
implement formulary apportionment unilaterally in the hopes that other countries would follow 
suit , the effectiveness of unitary taxation hinges upon the establishment of a united coalition of 97
countries. Unilateral adoption would lead to increased double taxation and/or nontaxation 
between countries with and without apportionment  while still failing to reduce international 98
corporate income tax avoidance in a majority of countries.  
95 Toder pg. 24 
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As with any policy, economic or otherwise, there is no perfect solution that can 
completely eradicate multinational tax avoidance without causing distortion in the international 
economy. Without even considering the political challenges that stand in the way of 
implementation, whether domestically or internationally, every option comes with additional 
economic externalities in the form of neutrality tradeoffs and other potentially adverse 
consequences. So is the best possible solution the one that does the most comprehensive job at 
stopping corporate tax avoidance? The one that causes the least distortion to the economy? 
Perhaps the one that faces the least political resistance in terms of implementation? There is truly 
no definitive answer: the takeaway of this paper is not to act in any particular way, but rather to 
act in ​some ​way, so that something is done to stand up for the international tax regime in the face 
of increasingly invulnerable multinational corporations across the globe.  
Conclusion 
The scholarly debate around international taxation and tax havens is very nearly as 
complicated as multinationals’ tax avoidance schemes themselves. Without a proper background 
in tax systems, the world of offshoring tends to seem opaque and formless, a writhing mass of 
individuals, companies, and Caribbean islands somehow operating in tandem to deprive the 
world economy of billions of dollars of wealth. This description overlooks the underlying 
structures that underpin not just the world of tax havens, but the corporate world itself. The tax 
avoidance system, though secretive, is not arbitrary: it is a carefully well-oiled machine, deftly 
built to pick apart loopholes and to leave no evidence of having done so. To be able to shut it 
down, it has to be understood and deconstructed for its every cog and gear. 
40 
 This paper therefore aims to establish a significant background on how international taxes 
work, how they lead to tax avoidance structures, why these structures are bad, and what could be 
done to eradicate them. By focusing on multinational corporate income tax avoidance, just one 
piece of the much larger offshoring pie, it aims to tackle an issue that many see as a gateway to 
some of the even more insidious financial flows harbored within tax haven jurisdictions. After 
all, as eloquently stated by Nicholas Shaxson, “We will never beat the terrorists or the heroin 
traffickers unless we confront the whole system—and that means tackling the tax evasion and 
avoidance and financial regulation and the whole paraphernalia of offshore .” It is imperative 99
policy measures be taken to improve our systems of international taxation, particularly to 
eliminate multinational tax avoidance. In doing so, we as an international community take a 
crucial and decisive first step—not only in the fight against the bane of tax havens, but also in 
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